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Abstract
This article deals with some phenomena of the Hungarian legal language from a 
historical point of view, with special regard to the terminology of private law going 
back to Roman law tradition. The author aims, on the one hand, to present the his-
torical background of the current terminology of Hungarian private law by means of 
some representative examples. On the other hand, it is attempted at demonstrating 
that “false friends” and some further misunderstandings in the current terminology 
of Hungarian private law can be led back to the historical determination of the con-
cepts/terms in question. A certain Hungarian legal language existed already in the 
16th c., however it reached the common European level by the middle of the 19th 
c. This development took place mainly under the influence of the Austrian and Ger-
man law and legal science. Due to the translation of foreign legal terms to Hungar-
ian since the 19th c. there emerged some “global” difficulties of legal terminology 
also in the Hungarian legal language. As the most important example, the reception 
of bona fides can be mentioned. It was an amendment of the Hungarian Civil Code 
in 2006 which tried to eliminate the misunderstandings as regards the principle of 
good faith (and fair dealing) conceived formerly by many Hungarian jurists exclu-
sively in subjective sense. The history of reception of the German notions of Gül-
tigkeit and Wirksamkeit in Hungary is extremely intriguing, too. Hungarian jurists 
did not follow the pattern of the German BGB but developed this pair created by 
Windscheid by drawing a clear distinction between the validity and effectiveness of 
legal transactions (as well as of the legal norms), similar to the Italian terminol-
ogy (validità v. efficacia). Sometimes the reception of German notions happened 
in a less successful way (e.g. in the case of negatives Interesse created by Jhering, 
which can be qualified as a “false friend” in Hungary in comparison with the origi-
nal German notion). Despite the important foreign, especially German impacts, the 
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Hungarian legal language is an autonomous one having several remarkable features 
which deserve attention also in comparison with terminology of the Western legal 
cultures.
Keywords Roman law · Reception · Autochthonous language · Neologism · Law of 
contracts · Good faith · Nullity · Interest
1 Introduction
The present article deals with some phenomena of the Hungarian legal language 
from a historical point of view, with special regard to the terminology of private 
law going back to Roman law tradition. My aim is, on the one hand, to present the 
historical background of the current terminology of Hungarian private law by means 
of some representative examples. On the other hand, it is attempted at demonstrating 
that “false friends” and some further misunderstandings in the current terminology 
of Hungarian private law can be led back to the historical determination of the con-
cepts/terms in question.
These purposes shall be reached through application of historical and compara-
tive methods covering mainly the comparative history of private law and to some 
extent also the historical and comparative linguistics with the reservation that not 
being a linguist but a jurist, the author has only a limited competence as regards the 
linguistics.1
As far as the notion of “false friends” is concerned, it is well-known that 
these words are from different languages which seem prima facie to be the same, 
but which have different meanings.2 An Italian legal comparatist and EU lawyer, 
Benacchio, quoting abundantly further literature as well, refers to a number of false 
friends. Albeit not using this technical term, Benacchio refers to the difference, e.g., 
between the “obligation” in terms of English law and the obligation of French law 
as well as the homologous obbligazione of Italian law [19: 37]. Also the difference 
between the cause of (former) French law and the causa of Italian law is dealt with 
by the Italian author [19: 38].
Identification of such terms leads to misunderstandings. As for the origin, essence 
and disadvantageous consequences of such misunderstandings, the present article 
will offer examples reviewing both the Hungarian development and its European 
context.
1 As regards the literature of linguistics, a Hungarian monograph [31], a Hungarian article [28], two 
old (i.e. 19th c.) Hungarian dictionaries [38, 39], furthermore various general, etymological as well as 
legal dictionaries of Latin, German, French and Hungarian languages [1, 2, 4, 9, 21, 25, 32, 41] were 
consulted.
2 The notion of “false friends” (faux amis) has been introduced in the literature of linguistics by Maxime 
Koessler and Jules Derocquigny in 1928 [29].
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2  On Historical Development of Hungarian Legal Language 
in General
The Hungarian legal language reached the common European level by the middle 
of the 19th century. Previously, being the official language of Hungary until 1844, 
the Latin language prevailed.3 The antecedents of Hungarian legal language are not 
to be underestimated. A Hungarian translation of Werbőczy’s Tripartitum by Balázs 
Weres (published in 1565) proves that a certain Hungarian legal language existed 
already in the 16th c. and obviously had to exist earlier as well. It is, however, dis-
cussed, how far the antecedents of Hungarian legal language can be traced back.4
Although the vocabulary of Hungarian legal language contained from the begin-
ning autochthonous Hungarian terms, foreign (especially Latin, Slavic, German, and 
recently English) words have continuously been received or literally translated to 
Hungarian.
The influence of Austrian and German law and legal science became exception-
ally significant from the beginning of 19th c. and this fact determined the intensive 
reception of German legal terms. Between 1849 and 1860 the official language of 
Hungary was the German language and this fact strengthened obviously the influ-
ence of German legal language. The impact of the German legal language concerned 
both the development of the Hungarian legal terminology and the way and style of 
legal explanations in Hungarian [58: 433].
3  On the Autochthonous Hungarian Legal Terms
First, I shall deal with the autochthonous Hungarian legal terms. If I qualify certain 
Hungarian legal terms as “autochthonous”, I do not mean that such words could be 
led back to the remote past. I mean much rather that they were created indepen-
dently (more or less) from foreign denominations of the given legal notion.
Already the Romans had the problem, how to name the guarantor (in French cau-
tion, in German Bürge). The substantive adpromissor could have been a suitable 
term for accessory debtors but it was only occasionally used,5 while as result of a 
3 As for the change from Latin to Hungarian it is characteristic that Ignác Frank (1788–1850), professor 
of private law in the University of Pest (today Budapest) published his treatise on the Hungarian private 
law first in Latin (Principia juris civilis Hungarici, I–II, Pestini 1828–1829), however, 16 years later the 
revised and enlarged edition of this work was published already in Hungarian [18]. Frank had an impor-
tant role in the creation of Hungarian legal terminology [22: 375; [46]: 221].
4 Kovács [31: 179] claimed that Hungarian legal language was born simultaneously with the foundation 
of the Kingdom of Hungary in 1000 A. D. and from the beginning the bilingualism of Latin and Hungar-
ian existed. Of course, it seems worth presuming that the most important legal terms had always a Hun-
garian equivalent (unless they were simply “Hungarized” like the term testamentom [‘will’], for which 
see infra) but even if their existence could be documented for the Middle Ages, it is doubtful whether the 
Hungarian legal terms existing in the early times constituted the critical mass for qualifying their sum as 
Hungarian legal language.
5 It is characteristic that in the title 45.1 (De obligationibus et actionibus) of the Digest the word 
adpromissor can be found in one passage only (Pomp. 26 ad Sab., D. 45.1.5.2), while the word fideius-
sor occurs not less than 31 times in the same title. A still larger disproportion (2:330) can be verified in 
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long development the word fideiussor became the mostly used term for the guaran-
tor in the imperial age. The substantive fideiussor meant originally and literally a 
debtor who assumed an obligation by means of a stipulation containing the words 
fide iubeo. The content of such a stipulation was not necessarily the assumption of 
suretyship. However, a positive correlation came into being between the use of fid-
eiussio and the assumption of suretyship, and in this way the fideiussio became the 
most important denomination of suretyship. It is to be supposed that a semantic nar-
rowing down took place in the course of development of the term fideiussor.6
This terminology has determined the Italian denomination of guarantor as fidei-
ussore (see Art. 1936 of the Italian Codice civile of 1942).
The French development followed the same model for some centuries. In the 
French language the word fidéjusseur was the conventional term of guarantor until 
the 14th c. Then, however, the word caution spread in the meaning ‘guarantor’ and 
pushed soon the more complicated word fidéjusseur into the background [32]. The 
French denomination caution can be regarded as a bit surprising since it was origi-
nally an abstract notion going back to ancient Roman law [41]. It is remarkable that 
the current French meaning of the word caution has hardly anything to do with its 
etymological origin. Considering these circumstances, we can regard the French 
term caution as a peculiar surrogate applied as the guarantor’s denomination faute 
de mieux. The current French term caution can be at the same time a dangerous false 
friend for Hungarian jurists if they suppose that caution meant in French some kind 
of caution money paid in advance by a debtor as a pecuniary guarantee for his future 
duties.
As far as the denomination of the guarantor is concerned, a more advantageous 
development took place in the German language, which has an autochthonous and 
adequate term for the guarantor, namely the substantive Bürge. This word docu-
mented already in the Middle Ages goes back to the verb bürgen and referred origi-
nally to the fact that the guarantor was invited to the conclusion of a contract of loan 
[9].7
The Hungarian term for the guarantor, too, namely the word kezes seems to be an 
autochthonous term. It is related with the Finno-Ugrian substantive kéz (in Finnish 
käsi) which means ‘hand’. This word documented in legal meaning since the 15th 
c. referred to the custom that the guarantor confirmed the assumption of obligation 
by means of handshaking. The problem referred to above as regards the fideiussor 
7 Unfortunately, I could not rely on Der Bürge einst und jetzt: Festschrift für Alfons Bürge, hrsg. Ulrike 
Babusiaux, Peter Nobel und Johannes Platschek, Zürich: Schulthess, 2017.
Footnote 5 (continued)
the title D. 46.3 (De solutionibus et liberationibus). The word adpromissor occurring quite seldom in 
the sources seems to be so much modern that some Romanists attributed it to postclassical or Justinianic 
interpolation, however e.g. Kaser [27: 661] rejected this suspicion.
6 As a notorious example of the semantic narrowing down the development of meaning of the Latin 
word manus in Roman law can be mentioned. The word manus in its abstract sense (i.e. when it did not 
mean ‘hand’) meant originally the pater familias’s power in general including his power upon his wife, 
his children as well as his slaves. Later, however, the abstract meaning of manus tended to narrow down 
to the marital power.
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emerges also in this case since handshaking was used not only at assumption of 
suretyship. As for the traditional rite of engagement, a woman who was proposed 
marriage would offer her hand in acceptance [49: 327ff]. A semantic narrowing 
down, if it was necessary, took place in the case of the word kezes very quickly, as it 
can be supposed on the basis of etymological dictionaries [2, 4].
The Hungarian language has an autochthonous term also for the contractual 
penalty (in Latin poena conventionalis, in German Konventionalstrafe). The cor-
responding Hungarian substantive kötbér being used also nowadays (see the new 
Hungarian Civil Code [Act No. V of 2013], Section  6:186–189) was created in the 
second half of the 19th c.8 Unaware of this word, Ignác Frank used a provisory (or 
perhaps an improvised) term instead, namely szószegés díja [‘fee of perfidy’] [18: 
595]. In a Hungarian legal dictionary published in 1843 (hereinafter TTM) the entry 
poena conventionalis is still missing [38]. The word vinculum, which should be 
according to Frank a synonym for the contractual penalty, was translated in the TTM 
[40] as ‘penitentiary money’ (bánatpénz, being a literal translation of the German 
Reugeld). The meaning ‘penitentiary money’ is given also at the entry vincularis 
poena by the TTM [40]. These facts show that it was not easy to find the final term, 
and in addition there was a standing risk of confusion of contractual penalty with 
similar legal institutions.9
Despite the difficulties at the outset, the term kötbér emerged and became quickly 
dominant in the second half of the 19th c. It is not quite clear why just this term was 
finally preferred. The word kötbér has namely a semantic deficiency insofar it means 
literally a “payment on the basis of an obligation”. That is why it could have in the 
beginning perhaps a wider meaning. However, as it seems, the neologism kötbér did 
not need a semantic narrowing down, it meant probably already in statu nascendi 
the contractual penalty only.10
The (perhaps) autochthonous Hungarian term for earnest (in Latin arrha poena-
lis, in German Draufgabe [in Germany], Angeld [in Austria], Haftgeld [in Switzer-
land]) is the word foglaló (see the Sect.  6:185 of Act No. V of 2013). Originally 
it was named foglaló pénz i.e. a sum of money (pénz) by which a thing to be sold 
was reserved for the buyer.11 In the course of its development the substantive pénz 
[‘money’] was omitted and the participle foglaló became an independent substantive 
in the specific legal meaning ‘earnest’.
8 While Bozóky [5: 359] used instead of kötbér still the word bírság [‘fine, penalty’], Suhayda [45: 249] 
used already the current terminology for earnest (foglaló), pentientiary money (bánatpénz) as well as for 
contractual penalty (kötbér).
9 Confusion of penalty and penitentiary money, which is present in the TTM [38], is understandable if 
considering that in these cases, in contrast to the earnest, a certain sum of money is not paid immediately 
to the other party but only in a later stage when some lesion of the duty took place. If such a sum of 
private law penalty is being paid simultaneously with conclusion of the contract, it is to be qualified as 
earnest. When payment in advance does not have a penal function, it can be qualified as advance money 
or deposit (caution) [16: 71ff].
10 As referred to above, Suhayda [45: 249] distinguished the kötbér unambiguously from the similar 
legal institutions.
11 The verb foglal is in use also in contemporary Hungarian language, e.g. in the meaning to reserve a 
table in a restaurant.
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The Hungarian equivalent of “price”, the word ár—having otherwise some sur-
prising homonyms—is of Finno-Ugrian origin. Its original meaning is not known. 
Later it meant ‘value’. The current meaning is first documented in the 12th c. [4].
4  Reception of Foreign Legal Terms in Hungarian Language
As for the earliest foreign impacts on the development of Hungarian language, the 
(first) impact of the Turkish language has to be stressed which took place already in 
the centuries before Hungarians arrived in the Carpathian Basin. This early impact 
is attested in the legal language e.g. by the words kölcsön [‘loanְ’] and bér [‘rent, 
fee’; in Latin merces] [4]. The Turkish origin of these words show the higher eco-
nomic level of Turkish population in those centuries.
Some Hungarian legal terms were borrowed from Slavic languages in the Middle 
Ages, like the substantives ispán [‘bailiff’],12 pénz [‘money’],13 kár [‘damage’],14 
zálog [‘pledge’],15 kamat [‘interest’; in German Zins].16 These words being signs 
of development of public administration and of commerce, attest that Slavic people 
(especially Serbs and Croatians) reached a certain level of these spheres earlier than 
Hungarians. It is a well-known fact that Serbian merchants had an outstanding role 
in Hungary for many centuries.
As far as the impact of the Latin language is concerned, it is to be noted that 
Roman law was never received in Hungary, it had, however, some impact on the 
development of Hungarian law already in the Middle Ages [22: 131ff, 372ff]. On 
the other hand, as referred to above, Latin was the official language of Hungary until 
1844. This fact is understandable if we consider that the Kingdom of Hungary was 
always a multi-ethnic country, and the Latin language served as lingua franca for 
learned people of all the nationalities. The longe durée of Latin as official language 
of Hungary can be explained also with the concern of Hungarian gentry that in the 
case of abolition of Latin the German language would have prevailed.17
There are many examples for direct reception of Latin terms with slight Mag-
yarization. Such a phenomenon is quite natural in the Neo-Latin languages, but in 
the Hungarian language it has not been regarded as normal since the beginning of 
the 19th c. When Benjámin Nánásy published his book on the testamentary succes-
sions in 1798 [34], there was not yet an autochthonous Hungarian term for the will, 
therefore it was named testamentom on the basis of the Latin term testamentum. In 
the TTM there are not less than twelve synonyms formed in the first half of the 19th 
12 First documented in the 13th c. It is probably of Slavic origin (zhupan) [4].
13 13th c. It was borrowed from a Slavic language and meant originally coin. A more remote root is the 
German Pfennig [4].
14 14th c. It was borrowed from a Slavic language [4].
15 15th c. It was borrowed probably from the Croatian zalog [4].
16 The Serbo-Croatian kamata goes back to the Greek kamatos. [2, 4].
17 This scenario was eventually realized, first in the time of the Emperor Joseph II (between 1784 and 
1790), and a second time after the failure of the liberty war in 1849, when German became again the offi-
cial language of Hungary until 1860.
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c. for the Hungarian denomination of testamentum [38]. In the first place the word 
végrendelet [literally ‘final disposition’] was mentioned, which was preferred also by 
Frank [18: 431ff], and which is in use nowadays as well (see the Sects. 7:12ff of Act 
No. V of 2013).
Some terms of Latin origin are living elements of the present-day Hungarian 
legal language. As a notorious example the Hungarian substantive uzsora can be 
mentioned which goes back to the Latin usura. This word appeared in Hungarian 
perhaps in the time of foundation of the Kingdom of Hungary and it can be docu-
mented since the 14th c. [28: 59ff]. The word meant in the beginning probably inter-
est in neutral sense, however its pejorative connotation connected with the creditors’ 
abusive conduct became soon dominant. This word (or its derivates) can be found 
both in the new Hungarian Civil Code of 2013 (the sedes materiae of the uzsorás 
szerződés [‘usurious contract’] is the Section 6:97 of Act No. V of 2013) and in the 
new Hungarian Criminal Code of 2012 (see the Section 381 of the Act No. C of 
2012 treating the uzsora-bűncselekmény [‘crime of usury’]).
It is more frequently the case that Latin terms have been translated to Hungar-
ian. Such a translation took place as regards the Latin term obligatio, on the basis 
of which the Hungarian equivalent kötelem was created not later than in 1831 [2]. 
This new word was one of the great many products of the reformation of Hungarian 
language which began as a cultural movement at the end of the 18th c. and reached 
its apogee in the first half of the 19th c. Although also the German word Verbindli-
chkeit (used already e.g. by Kant and Lessing [21]) could be the source, the Hungar-
ian verb kötelez [‘to oblige’] going back to the ancient Finno-Ugrian verb köt [‘to 
bind’] was used in legal meaning as early as in the 14th c. [4]. Maybe it is on the 
basis of chronological considerations that this usage of the verb kötelez is led back 
by the etymological dictionaries to Latin origin [4].
It was not a quick development that the neologism kötelem spread as denomina-
tion of obligation. In the TTM not less than twelve Hungarian equivalents of the 
obligatio can be found, however, the kötelem was not included there [38]. Frank [18: 
545] preferred the word tartozás.18 This Hungarian word corresponds to the Latin 
debitum and to the German Schuld (in contradistinction to Haftung). Searching for 
the Hungarian equivalent of obligatio János Henfner ascertained in 1856 that it is 
impossible to express the various meanings of obligatio with a single Hungarian 
term. Henfner thought that all the Hungarian legal expressions derived from the verb 
köt [‘to bind’] and in this way also the substantive kötelem had been connected with 
the debtor’s duty, while the obligatio meant the whole legal relationship between the 
creditor and the debtor including therefore also the creditor’s rights [23: III, 1f].
Regarding these circumstances it is remarkable that the substantive kötelem could 
assume the meaning obligatio. I think that this development could take place since 
kötelem was a more abstract word than the similar words kötelezettség [‘duty’] and 
kötelezés [‘imposing a duty’] connected more closely to the debtor’s duties. The 
term kötelem spread in the second half of the 19th c. and is a fundamental notion of 




Hungarian civil law nowadays as well (see the Book 6 of Act No. V of 2013 entitled 
Kötelmi jog [‘Law of obligations’]).
A further example of translation of Latin legal terms is óvadék [‘caution money’] 
which is a more or less literal translation of the Latin term cautio [‘the taking of pre-
cautions, care, circumspection’, ‘a precautionary measure’].19
As far as the impact of German legal language is concerned, some German words 
were directly received in a Hungarized form. The Hungarian word for citizen (pol-
gár) goes back to the German Bürger. This reception took place as early as in the 
14th c. [4]. In this way the mayor is named in Hungarian also nowadays polgárm-
ester which is an exact equivalent of the German term Bürgermeister. The German 
legal terms received in this way (e.g. móring [‘dowry’, cf. Morgengabe]; soltész [‘a 
kind of mayor’, cf. Schultheiß) became mostly obsolete [4].
A considerable part of the current Hungarian legal vocabulary is constituted by 
words which have been literally translated from German. Notorious examples of this 
kind are the Hungarian terms for acquisitive and extinctive prescription. Their crea-
tion is interesting especially in comparative historical context.
The acquisitive prescription is named in contemporary Hungarian elbirtoklás (see 
the Sections 5:44-5:49 of Act No. V of 2013). This word is in relation with the verb 
birtokol [‘to possess’] and with the deverbative birtoklás [‘possessing’]. It was cre-
ated not later than in 1835 ([39: II, 247], s. v. Ersitzung),20 however, it cannot be 
found among the seven Hungarian equivalents of usucapio registered in the TTM 
[38] and Frank [18] did not use it either.21
Henfner named the acquisitive prescription átruházó elévülés [‘übertragende 
Verjährung’] and alternatively also elbirtoklás [‘Ersitzung’] [23: II, 68]. Why did 
Henfner regard the term elévülés—documented first in 1837 [4] —as a hypernym 
covering not only the extinctive but also the acquisitive prescription? In order to 
understand Henfner’s terminology—inspired by the Austrian civil code being effec-
tive in the time of publication of his textbook—it is necessary to refer briefly to the 
antecedents going back to Roman law.22
For many centuries the Romans knew only the acquisitive prescription which was 
coined usucapio during the classical period. Some early forms of the extinctive pre-
scription emerged only in the early imperial age when the praescriptio longi tempo-
ris appeared. This expression referred to a special exception of the “long time”. It 
was given to the defendant possessing a provincial real estate (fundus provincialis) 
19 See [20], cf. [41]. The history of the Latin term cautio and its huge impact on the development of 
European languages would deserve an independent study. In Hungarian legal language there exists a 
slightly Hungarized equivalent of the Latin cautio, namely the word kaució. As it has been referred to 
above, the French caution and the Hungarian kaució can be especially dangerous “false friends”.
20 This passage is quoted as the earliest record (still in the obsolete form elbirtokolás) in [1], s. v.
21 Frank [18: 239] tried to find a Hungarian equivalent for acquisitive prescription as well as for usucap-
tion but his alternative terms seem to be of improvised character. The terminological difficulties were 
connected with the fact that in old Hungarian private law the acquisitive prescription i.e. the usucaption 
was not (or not generally) recognized [57: 243f].
22 It is to be remarked that the textbooks used by Henfner as a model, applied different terms for acquisi-
tive prescription (usucaption), namely Schilling [40: 447ff] used the term “erwerbende Verjährung”, 
while Haimberger [53: 60ff] used the term “Ersitzung”.
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for 10 or 20 years against the action (rei vindicatio utilis) instituted by the quasi-
owner of the same real estate.
Later some terminological as well as conceptual confusion emerged since new 
forms of extinctive prescription appeared which tended to assume also acquisitive 
character when the defendant was possessor of a real estate. As a result of the former 
trends the meaning of usucapio was narrowed down in the Justinianic law to the 
usucaption of movable things, while for the usucaption of real estates the not quite 
new term praescriptio longi temporis was introduced.
The classical praescriptio longi temporis as a special kind of exceptio concerning 
a specific type of extinctive prescription constituted the origin both of the general 
rule of extinctive prescription (praescriptio XXX vel XL annorum) laid down in a 
constitution of Theodosius II (in 424) as well as of the acquisitive prescription of 
real estates (praescriptio longi temporis) enacted by Justinian. Justinian introduced 
in addition also an extraordinary acquisitive prescription (praescriptio XXX vel XL 
annorum) [6: 141ff; slightly differently [35]: 193].
It is superfluous to observe, what an enormous impact these legal institutions had 
on the later history of European private law. In the medieval French law the usucap-
tion of movable things disappeared and in this way the prescription could become a 
hypernym covering all the types of acquisitive and extinctive prescriptions.
In German legal culture, however, this terminology did not apply. On the con-
trary, the autochthonous German terms Verjährung (first documented in the 16th c.) 
and Ersitzung (first documented in the 17th c.) rendered possible a sharp distinction 
between the extinctive and acquisitive prescription [21].
The German terminology of prescription is advantageous not only because of 
its distinctive character but also because of its linguistic adequacy. The Latin term 
praescriptio, regarding its etymology, does not have anything to do either with the 
essence of the acquisitive or with that of the extinctive prescription.23 The German 
terms refer, however, to an essential moment of the legal institutions in question, 
namely to the possession and to elapsing of the years respectively. Notwithstanding 
elapsing of years is essential also as regards the acquisitive prescription, therefore 
the German terminology is not entirely logical in this respect.
The Hungarian terminology of both types of prescription was determined by the 
corresponding German terms, which have literally been translated to Hungarian 
and spread in the course of the 19th c. Forging definitive Hungarian terms of these 
legal institutions was, however, neither an easy nor a quick process. The various 
23 The praescriptio means literally only words which are written in the beginning of a (legal) text, 
namely in the beginning of the text of a lex adopted by the comitia or in the beginning of the text of a 
formula emitted by the praetor. Its meaning ‘exception’ came into being in connection with the fact that 
some important exceptions of the defendant were included in the praescriptio of the praetorian formula. 
My students in the first year, if not yet aware of these historical antecedents, ask me sometimes wonder-
ing, why the Roman word praescriptio means ‘acquisitive/extinctive prescription’ instead of ‘legal provi-
sion’, while the more familiar German word Vorschrift means in fact ‘[a kind of] provision’, in accord-
ance with its Hungarian equivalent előírás being literally translated from German. My students are often 
surprised when I tell them that also the French word prescription means first of all ‘acquisitive or extinc-
tive prescription’ rather than ‘legal provision’. In this way both the Latin praescriptio and the French 
prescription can be false friends for Hungarians having only a limited knowledge of legal terminology.
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Hungarian equivalents given by the TTM [38] seem to be of improvised character.24 
It was only in the second half of the 19th c. that the terms elévülés and elbirtoklás 
became dominant.
It is a recent development that some English terms like “factoring” and “leas-
ing” have appeared with slight Magyarization of orthographic character in the text 
of the new Civil Code of Hungary (Act No. V of 2013, Sections 6:405ff, 6:409ff). 
Moreover, in a remarkable way, the notion of “franchising” has been received in the 
text of the new Civil Code without Magyarization of its orthography (see the word 
franchise in the Sections 6: 376ff).
5  Some Global Problems of Legal Terminology and Their Presence 
in the Hungarian Legal Language
Due to the translation of foreign legal terms to Hungarian since the 19th c. there 
emerged some “global” difficulties of legal terminology also in the Hungarian 
legal language. As the most important example, the reception of bona fides can be 
mentioned.
The notion of bona fides going back to Roman law (translated to English with the 
not quite innocent term “good faith” [19: 37f; [26]: 1253]), apart from its further 
meanings, has par excellence an objective and a subjective meaning. These two dif-
ferent meanings are expressed in German since the entering in force of the BGB 
(1900) by the technical terms Treu und Glauben and guter Glaube respectively.
If the terminology of a given legal culture does not have but one technical term 
for both meanings of the good faith only, the risk of confusion of the two mean-
ings remains present [48: 12]. Formerly in the most civil law jurisdictions, similarly 
otherwise to common law jurisdictions [7: 198ff], a kind of “subjective monism” 
prevailed, namely the good faith was regarded as a subjective state of mind also in 
the law of contracts. In Austria, however, a kind of “objective monism” has tradi-
tionally prevailed, i.e. the good faith referred to as Redlichkeit has been an objective 
standard also in the law of things [36: 229ff]. The global development of the notion 
of good faith can be described grosso modo as a development from the dominance 
of subjective monism to that of the dualism in terms of terminological distinction of 
the two basic meanings of good faith. The Hungarian development follows to this 
global trend [14, 17].
The Hungarian equivalent of the term good faith (and fair dealing) was created 
slowly. The Bill of a Private Law Code for Hungary in 1928 fixed in its Sect.  2 
the term jóhiszeműség és tisztesség [‘good faith and honesty’] as denomination 
of the objective good faith. The subjective good faith was referred to simply as 
jóhiszeműség [‘good faith’] in the Sect. 3. This solution was inspired by the Swiss 
24 In the TTM [38] there were four Hungarian synonymous equivalents for Verjaehrung, and, as men-
tioned above, seven synonyms for usucapio, not to speak about the thirteen synonyms for praescriptio. 
One of the most ancient Hungarian translations of praescriptio was időmúlás (‘elapsing of time’), see the 
Tripartitum, I, 78 as translated by Balázs Weres (Debreczen, 1565).
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Civil Code.25 The terminology of the Bill of 1928 could not safeguard an unambigu-
ous distinction of the two notions in Hungary in the subsequent decades.
From 1949 the concept of “good faith and honesty” was regarded in Hungary as 
being incompatible with socialist civil law.26 Therefore, instead of this formula, the 
para. 1 of Sect. 4 of the Hungarian Civil Code of 1959 (Act No. IV of 1959) laid 
down that “[i]n the course of exercising their rights and fulfilling their duties the 
parties in civil law relations shall display such a conduct that enforcement of their 
interests shall be in harmony with the interest of society.” The para 2. laid down that 
“[i]n civil law relations [the parties] shall cooperate mutually and act in compliance 
with the requirements of socialist coexistence. Cooperation shall be realized by the 
exact fulfilment of the duties and by such an enforcement of rights which is in com-
pliance with their [social] destination.”
As regards the Preliminary provisions of the Civil Code of 1959, the expression 
“good faith” did not disappear totally in their text, since the Sect. 6 laid down that 
“[t]he court may obligate to full or partial reparation the person whose intentional 
behaviour has induced another person in good faith to such a conduct whereby the 
latter has suffered a damage through no fault of his own.” However, this reference is 
connected basically with the subjective good faith of the possible plaintiff, while it 
is only in indirect relationship with the objective good faith.
After entering in force of the Civil Code of People’s Republic of Hungary on 
1st of May 1960 for some decades “good faith” survived in Hungarian civil law 
as an exclusively subjective notion. This development was useful in a way because 
between 1960 and 1991 it allowed that Hungarian lawyers not to confuse the two 
meanings of good faith, at least surely not within the Hungarian civil law. Notwith-
standing the elimination of principle of good faith and honesty caused considerable 
misunderstandings when a Novel in 1991 (Act No. XIV of 1991), overwriting the 
corresponding socialist formula, re-introduced the classical principle of “good faith 
and honesty”. Even a number of highly qualified Hungarian jurists supposed then, 
and also some years later that the good faith mentioned in this passage would be 
identical with the subjective good faith known especially in the law of things [12: 
59ff].
25 See the para 1. of Sect. 2 (with reference to Treu und Glauben) and the Art. 3 of the Swiss Civil Code 
(with reference to guter Glaube). While the German text of the Swiss Civil Code applies, similarly to the 
German BGB, an absolutely clear distinctive terminology in these passages, the distinction of the two 
meanings of bonne foi (buona fede) is less evident in the French and Italian versions of this code.
26 The same condemnation applied also as regards the principle of prohibition of contracts “contrary to 
good morals (and public order)” which was also laid down in Sect. 973 of the Bill of 1928, following the 
example of (old) Art. 1133 of the French Code civil. That is why in para. 2 of Section 200 of the Civil 
Code of 1959 a socialist formula was substituted for the classical principle concerning the contracts con-
tra bonos mores. The socialist formula contained a reference to an “evident” conflict with “the interests 
of the working people or to the requirements of socialist coexistence”. It was only the Novel of 1991 
which restored the classical formula, preserving the adverb “evidently” (which was otherwise inspired 
probably by the para. 2 of Art. 2 of the Swiss Civil Code), and at the same time, omitting the reference to 
the public order mentioned in the Bill of 1928. As it is known, in 2016 a significant reform of the French 




This fact is a remarkable sign of the global problem that the term “good faith” 
used in the context of objective good faith and fair dealing can be an extremely dan-
gerous “false friend” when jurists not aware of the semantic dualism of the good 
faith suppose that good faith has to mean always the good faith in subjective sense.
In December 2005, the Hungarian parliament amended (through the Act No. 
III of 2006) the text of the Civil Code of 1959 (having been in force with several 
amendments until 2014) in order to eliminate the confusion of the subjective and 
objective meanings of the good faith [14: 53ff; [17]: 312ff.] In the new Hungarian 
Civil Code (Act No. V of 2013) the terminological corrections of the Novel of 2006 
apply (see the para 1. of Section 1:3 as well as the para 1. of Section 6:102 of the 
Act No. V of 2013, with references to jóhiszeműség és tisztesség [‘good faith and 
honesty’]).
A similar terminological problem concerning the buona fede has emerged in Italy 
on the occasion of implementation of the EEC directive 93/13. From the beginning 
a number of Italian jurists have criticized the ambiguous expression “malgrado la 
buona fede” in the Art. 1469-bis inserted into the Codice civile in 1996 (which still 
survives in the Art. 33 of Codice del consumo of 2005) [19: 37].
The history of reception of the German notions of Gültigkeit and Wirksamkeit 
(contradistinguished for the first time by Windscheid) in Hungary is extremely 
intriguing, too. Since 1900, the German jurists influenced by the terminology of 
the BGB have preferred to use the word Wirksamkeit in the meaning ‘invalidity’, 
although this notion was named by the Pandectists (e.g., by Savigny) themselves 
Gültigkeit, while the term Wirksamkeit tended to mean ‘effectiveness’ (of the legal 
transactions) in the late Pandectistics.27
The Hungarian legal terminology did not follow the terminology of the BGB but 
developed the late Pandectistic terms by drawing a clear distinction between the 
notions of validity and effectiveness of legal transactions (as well as of legal norms). 
Creation of the corresponding Hungarian terms took place in 1914. It was the 
merit of Gáspár Menyhárth, a professor of private law in the University of Kolozs-
vár (today Cluj-Napoca in Romania) to have introduced the terms érvénytelenség 
[‘invalidity’] and hatályosság [‘ineffectiveness’] in Hungarian legal language [33: 
269ff].28 This terminology was received in the Civil Code of 1959 (see in particular 
the para. 1 and 2 of Section 237 as well as the Sections 644–653 of Act No. IV of 
27 It was Windscheid who first tried to distinguish the Ungültigkeit conceived as invalidity from Unwirk-
samkeit conceived as ineffectiveness [56: I, 423, 444ff, 461, 471]. A clear and well-founded distinction 
between the Ungültigkeit and Unwirksamkeit was made first by Figge [10]. See more thoroughly [11: 
73ff; [42]: 342ff].
28 It is interesting that in the same year (1914) a professor of the University of Lemberg, namely Ernst 
Till published a study with a similar message, namely suggesting the clear distinction of Gültigkeit and 
Wirksamkeit [50: 209ff]. Albeit there were some antecedents of such a distinctive terminology, see espe-
cially Imre Zlinszky [57: 116ff], the contradistinction of érvényesség and hatályosság was not yet well-
founded in Zlinszky’s work. He did not explain, on the one hand, the corresponding doctrine and, on the 
other hand, even the title of his work is not coherent with the terminological distinction applied even-
tually by him, since Zlinszky should not have referred to the érvény [‘validity’] but much more to the 
hatály [‘effectiveness’] of Hungarian private law treated by him. These developments escaped even the 
attention of Iván Siklósi in his comprehensive monograph [42].
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1959) and it applies also in the new Civil Code of 2013 (see, in particular, the Sec-
tions 6:118 and 7:37–7:47 of Act No. V of 2013).
It is needless to deny that the concept of ineffectiveness is not well-founded. Due 
to this immanent deficiency and also due to some inaccurateness committed during 
the codification (namely due to the uncritical reception of expressions used in for-
mer drafts having a less distinguished terminology29) both the former and the new 
Hungarian civil codes lay down that a testament (i.e. a will) loses its effectiveness if 
the testator withdraws the will. Effectiveness of the testaments before the testator’s 
death seems to constitute a contradiction if considering the meaning of effectiveness 
in the Hungarian law of contracts [11, 42, 43].
Despite this slight deficiency, the Hungarian terminology of invalidity and inef-
fectiveness is to be regarded in my modest opinion as a great achievement in the 
global history of the legal notions. As far as I know, such a clear contradistinction 
of these notions is not known in the Western legal cultures except the Italian civil 
law.30 Nevertheless, an analogous clear distinction of these notions is known e.g. in 
Russian civil law, too, in which the substantives dejstvitelnost and dejstvie are used 
in terms of validity and effectiveness respectively (see the Art. 166–181 of Grazh-
danskij Kodeks Rossijskoj Federacii of 1994).
It is an interesting phenomenon as regards the history of the influence of Pandec-
tistics that some late Pandectistic ideas have been followed in some Eastern Euro-
pean legal systems and also in Italy. It would be interesting to verify whether such 
efforts have taken place also in further East European legal systems.
As a recent important achievement of the Hungarian legal language the clear and 
well-founded distinction of four spheres of the civil law liability lato sensu can be 
highlighted. These four spheres, which can be led back in a way to Roman law,31 
are as follows: the normal civil law (contractual and extracontractual) liability 
(felelősség), the liability of guarantors, heirs, etc. (helytállás), the warranty (szava-
tosság), and the bearing the risks (veszélyviselés).32 During the preparation of the 
new Civil Code of 2013 it was a priority that the expressions related with normal 
civil law (i.e. contractual and extracontractual) liability (felel, felelős, felelősség) 
shall not occur in those passages of the Civil Code in which one of the other three 
types of (strict) liability are treated.
29 The former drafts of a Hungarian civil code—including the Bill of 1928 (sections  1957–1962)—
qualified the withdrawal of testaments as a case of rendering a testament ineffective (hatálytalanítás). 
However, in the terminology of the former drafts the terms érvényesség and hatályosság were not con-
tradistinguished in terms of validity and effectiveness, much more they were treated as synonyms. As an 
important sign of the undistinguished use of the two terms can be referred to the fact that the other case 
of “hatálytalanítás” was the impugnment of testaments (see the Sections 1953–1956 of the Bill of 1928) 
which would be named today “érvénytelenítés” [11, 42, 43].
30 In Italian legal language it is customary to distinguish between the validità and efficacia of legal trans-
actions, see e.g. [37: 363ff; [44]: 19ff], see, however, also [51: 192].
31 Cf. e.g. the division of titles concerning the emptio venditio in the Digest on the basis of distinction of 
normal contractual liability (D. 19.1), warranty (D. 18.5) and bearing of risks (D. 18.6).
32 As for the contradistinction of the liability in narrower sense on the one hand and the debts on the 
other, see [25: 1084, cf. [13]: 89ff].
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Occasionally the reception of German legal notions took place in a less success-
ful way in Hungary. As for the positives and negatives Interesse created by Jher-
ing in 1861 [24], a problematical metamorphosis of these notions has emerged in 
Hungary. The “positive interesse” has meant in Hungary for many decades the full 
indemnification including also the compensation of lucrum cessans, while the “neg-
ative interesse” has meant the reimbursement of the costs emerging due to conclud-
ing a void contract.33
We may take as granted that not every Hungarian lawyer has realized perfectly 
that the attributes “positive” and “negative” were not connected with the higher or 
lower amount of indemnification. As it is known, the introduction of these terms by 
Jhering into the legal language was purported to make manifest the difference that in 
case of positive interesse the indemnification had to be paid as if the valid contract 
of the parties had been correctly fulfilled, while in case of the negative interesse the 
damages had to be paid as if the parties had not concluded their invalid contract at 
all.34 Evaluating the reception of the negative interesse in Hungarian civil law we 
can ascertain that this notion can be a “false friend” for those Hungarian jurists who 
meet the negatives Interesse of German law and vice versa.
Unfortunately, the meaning of the attributes “positive” and “negative” is not 
homogeneous in legal science. A more traditional use of these attributes is con-
nected with the classification of proprietary rights. Following an earlier tradition 
33 Even Géza Marton in [47: III, 395; IV, 905, n. 41] used these concepts in a somewhat ambiguous 
manner (e.g. calling the positive interesse sometimes “full indemnification” while stressing the limited 
character of the negative interesse). The German terms of the two types of interesse have been received 
in Hungarian with slight Hungarization (pozitív/negatív interessze). It is to be remarked, however, that 
in contrast to the most European languages receiving the general notion of interest from the Latin infini-
tive interesse (in French interêt, in German Interesse, in Russian interes), the Hungarian language has an 
autochthonous substantive created in 1825 by means of substantivization of the verb érdekel documented 
first in the 17th c. The most remote root of these words is the very old verb ér [‘to reach’] of unclear ori-
gin. The same ancient verb constitutes the origin of the words érték [‘value’, 16th c.] and érvény [‘valid-
ity’, 19th c.] [4]. The consideration of this fact can throw light on the problem, whether it was possible 
that B. Grosschmid could elaborate his “theory of interest” without making use of the works of Jhering 
[52: 205].
34 The problematical interpretation of the positive and negative interesse in Hungarian civil law being 
dominant also in the current literature did not help surely the development of the corresponding regula-
tion. According to the para. 2 of the Section 6:115 of the new Civil Code of 2013 “For any loss caused to 
the other party by way of the conclusion of an invalid contract compensation shall be provided in accord-
ance with the general provisions of non-contractual liability. If the party responsible for the invalidity of 
the contract is able to justify his conduct, he shall be liable for any loss caused to the other party by way 
of the conclusion of the [void] contract.” This regulation contains inherent contradictions. The general 
rule of non-contractual liability laid down in the Section 6:519 renders possible that the tortfeasor prove 
that his conduct was not attributable i.e. that he acted as it could be generally expected in the given 
situation, cf. para. 1. of the Section 1:4. However, if the contracting party proves the lack of his culpa in 
contrahendo, he will be still liable for the (direct) loss emerging due to conclusion of the void contract. 
In the case of the failure of such an exculpation he will be liable for the full loss of the other party. While 
the Hungarian Civil Code of 1959 did not regulate the liability for culpa in contrahendo at all, the new 
Civil Code has introduced a more strict liability for this case than the general rule of delictual liability, 
albeit according to the wording of the rule in question the same level of liability should apply both as 
regards the normal causation of damage and as regards the conduct leading to conclusion of a void con-
tract. Here I do not want to analyse the problem of the exact meaning of the “loss caused to the other 
party by way of the conclusion of the [void] contract”.
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Pandectists like Julius Baron contradistinguished the positive and negative propri-
etary rights [3: 239]. The right of vindication as well as further rights of protection 
of ownership were qualified as negative rights with regard to the actio negatoria of 
Roman law, by which the owner denied (nego, negare) that another person had some 
right (e.g. a servitude) on his own thing. That is why the other proprietary rights 
were qualified a contrario as positive rights [15: 378]. Further legal meanings of the 
couple of positive–negative come closer to the normal use of these attributes.35
6  Conclusions
Like the entire Hungarian law, its terminology also shows mainly the impact of Aus-
trian and German law and the German legal language still nowadays. Although Hun-
gary belonged to the Austrian Hungarian Monarchy until 1918, it was not always the 
Austrian law which had the strongest impact in Hungary, namely it was often the 
German law, and especially the German Pandectistics which had a decisive impact 
on the development of Hungarian private law since the middle of the 19th century.
As far as the “false friends” in legal terminology are concerned, they emerge 
sometimes due to parallel developments of similar legal institutions of common 
(e.g. Roman law) origin, in other cases they are consequences of reception of foreign 
terms/concepts. E.g. if the term cause and causa respectively have different mean-
ings in the (former) French and in the Italian law, it is a consequence of parallel 
developments with different results.
The false friends which have emerged in Hungarian legal terminology are much 
more results of reception. Until the 19th c. and since 1990 a number of legal terms 
received in Hungarian legal language appeared and they appear again with their 
original (or slightly Hungarized) name (e.g. testamentom, negatív interessze, faktor-
ing, lízing, franchise). Normally, however, the terms received in Hungary from for-
eign legal cultures are translated to Hungarian.
Simple borrowings and literal translations can increase the probability of mis-
understandings especially if they contain words of ambiguous interpretation (e.g., 
the adjective “negative” in the case of negative interesse). Creation of new terms, 
however, can sometimes prevent the appearing of false friends, like it was the case 
when a socialist principle, peculiar as it might be, was substituted for the classical 
principle of good faith and fair dealing in the Civil Code of 1959.
More thorough research could clarify, why “false friends” emerged in the single 
cases. As regards the misunderstanding of the meaning of negative interesse, both 
the Hungarian jurists’ superficial knowledge of Jhering’s theory and an intentional 
endeavour to limit the liability in Hungarian judicature could have a role.
Evaluating in general the characteristics of the Hungarian legal language, it can 
be ascertained that in spite of the foreign influences Hungarian legal language is an 
35 The attribute negatív is used three times in the norm text of the Act No. V of 2013 (Section 4:116; 




autonomous one having a number of remarkable features which deserve attention 
also in comparison with the terminology of the Western legal cultures.36 I hope to 
have proven above that both the preparation of the Hungarian Civil Code of 1959 
and that of the new Civil Code of 2013 constituted important contribution to the 
development of legal culture and in any case the number of “false friends” had been 
reduced thanks to the Hungarian codifications. The terminological distinction of the 
subjective and objective good faith in the new Civil Code of 2013 as well as that of 
invalidity and ineffectiveness elaborated already in the Civil Code of 1959 could 
serve as a model also in international context.
This might lead to sketch an optimistic epilogue of the present essay but still I 
resist the temptatio lectorem delectandi in order to call attention to some regrettable 
shortcomings of legal terminology. It was more than 300 years ago that Leibniz sug-
gested to improve legal science by means of the mos geometricus. It was more than 
170 years ago that Julius von Kirchmann published in 1848 his essay entitled Die 
Werthlosigkeit der Jurisprudenz als Wissenschaft. Such warnings had considerable 
impact. Many efforts have been made to improve the legal terminology in the last 
two centuries. Notwithstanding it has not been sufficiently elaborated so far. Besides 
the theoretical inconveniencies, the ambiguous, mistakable and incoherently applied 
terms may cause practical difficulties and sometimes these conundrums remain 
unresolved by the judges. Legal notions often constitute a source of misunderstand-
ing, because ordinary lawyers are no longer aware of their history. The principle 
of (objective) bona fides exemplifies very well this problem. This term can be cor-
rectly interpreted par excellence only if considering its original meanings in Roman 
law which have determined all the later developments of this complex notion. False 
friends may become good friends if we know them better, including their historical 
background in comparative context. That is the reason why since a while I feel like 
understanding the very reason of an obviously exaggerated statement attributed to 
Joseph Story as follows: “no man could be a great lawyer unless he was an expert 
scholar in Greek and Latin” [55: 28].37
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36 When preparing material for his great opus Der Zweck im Recht, Rudolf von Jhering asked for data 
on Hungarian language (especially as regards the expressions of politeness) from a renown Hungarian 
philologist, Emil Ponori-Thewrewk as well as from his former student, Mihály Biermann (who became 
professor of Roman law in Hermannstadt [today Sibiu in Romania]). It was interesting for Jhering to 
learn that the Hungarian equivalent of ‘virtue’ (in German Tugend), namely the word erény was cre-
ated (as a neologism) from the word erő [‘power, strength’; in German Kraft]. Jhering stressed also that 
the Hungarian equivalent of ‘honour’ [in German Ehre], namely the word becsület was created from the 
word becs [‘value’]. Jhering observed that „Ehre ist also dem Zeugnisse dieser fünf ganz verschiedenen 
Sprachstämmen angehörigen Sprachen [viz. Greek, Latin, German, Hebrew, Hungarian — A. F.] zufolge 
der Werth der Person.” [54: 226, 501].
37 Quoted by Daniel Coquillette [8: 25]. Forerunners of this idea were the Glossators criticizing the 
Lombard jurists and later the Humanists criticizing especially the Glossators. See e.g. Lucas de Penna 
(14th c.), Commentaria in tres posteriores libros Codicis Iustiniani, Lugduni 1582, 466, with reference 
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